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January 2, 2019by arma_admin

Information Technology and Modern Public Service: How To Avoid IT Project Failure and Promote Success

SAGESSE: JOURNAL OF CANADIAN RECORDS AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AN ARMA CANADA PUBLICATION
WINTER, 2019 VOLUME IV, ISSUE I

 

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND MODERN PUBLIC SERVICE:
HOW TO AVOID IT PROJECT FAILURE AND PROMOTE SUCCESS

BY SCARLETT KELLY

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 2

Background……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 2

What are IT project failures and IT projects success?……………………………………………………………. 3

The factors that determine IT project failures……………………………………………………………………….. 5

People…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 6

Process……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 7

Product……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 11

Case study……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 12

Recommendations for promoting IT projects success………………………………………………………….. 13

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 15

References……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 17

 

INTRODUCTION

Successful information technology (IT) projects have the potential to support and transform governmental functions to a higher level of efficiency and cost-effectiveness when delivering services to end-users.1 In this sense, the ideal state is that successful IT projects have the potential to improve public service functions and deliver services to citizens more efficiently and cost effectively.2 However, a global scan shows that IT projects have as high as 85% failure rates and only 15% success rates.3

The reality is that Canada seldom receives such benefits because of the repeated IT project failures and many unanswered questions behind these failures. How can we define IT project failures and successes? Who are the most important stakeholders in any IT project? Facing the negative consequences of IT project failures, especially the financial burden, is the purpose of this paper which performs an in-depth analysis of IT project failure/success factors with real-life examples, including the Phoenix pay system4 as a case study.

To answer the research question “what are the factors that contribute to the success or the failures of IT projects in governments,” this paper will examine the three key factors of IT projects — the people involved, IT processes (purpose of the project, planning, and implementation with a focus on external/internal management), and product to deliver to users. After presenting a holistic understanding of IT project failures, this paper will make actionable recommendations in the Canadian context for promoting IT project success.

Based on the research done to date, the key finding is that many of the IT projects are politically motivated and departmental staff expertise is often overlooked. Lack of leadership and sufficient in-house IT knowledge appears to have made governments make decisions by instinct, so the failure of linking IT products with the internal departmental function becomes inevitable.

 

BACKGROUND

The application of IT in the government fundamentally changed the government in no less a way than the French revolution reshaped Europe or printing technology shaped the western civilization.5 6 Electronic government, or e-government provides a channel for citizens to directly communicate with the government in an online environment, which enhances citizen engagement, provides new information presentation, and consultation.7 However, IT projects do not always return benefits. The Auditor General of Canada (Auditor General) found that in the Department of National Defence (DND), IT project implementation took on average seven years after a long seven-year funding approval.8 Moreover, by 1994 about $1.2 billion out of $3.2 billion in the IT program budget was not supported by a plan that monitors expenditure and the implementation process, and $700 million could have been saved if 11 projects had been implemented based on priority.9

In addition to the technology failure, IT disruptions frequently happens because of:

  • the failure of planning, managing and decision-making when implementing IT products;
  • the lack of control and risk 10

Three main factors contribute to the IT failure or success in the government—people, process and product.11

  • People include government departments, external stakeholders, and citizens/end-users.
  • The IT project process begins with finding the right project and ends with implementing the project within a specific timeline. In other words, the IT process is a business process which includes defining the purpose of introducing IT products (the question why), listing all the desired features of the product, purchasing or manufacturing the product by establishing partnerships with the private sector, developing a detailed and complete implementation plan (financing, deadlines, evaluation, and accountability), managing the implementation both internally and externally, and delivering a functioning final product. Both senior management commitment and project management play vital roles in the IT process because of the complex relations between the public and private sectors as well as the considerations within the government and with end-users, which will be discussed in detail in the “process” section.
  • Product includes the technology selected for users and its performance

The three components are inter-related; for example, when people fail to work together and develop a common goal, the IT process will not go smoothly and meet the goals all stakeholders agreed upon. The obstacles in the IT product implementation process can lead to malfunctioning projects which directly result in the final products not meeting the needs of the stakeholders. However, this relationship is not linear. For example, any problems in the process could change the relations among the people involved, which can change the final product and the performance evaluation framework. All these will be discussed in detail in the next few sections of this paper.

 

WHAT ARE IT PROJECT FAILURES AND IT PROJECT SUCCESSES?

IT project success is defined as most/all stakeholder groups having attained their major goals and there are no significant undesirable outcomes of IT process and products. 12 Such success is achieved by following project schedules, staying in budget, and delivering a final IT product that functions fully as expected. No part in the people, process, and product IT project lifecycle can fail.

The opposite of IT project success, IT project failure, can be defined as project outcomes are not what stakeholders initially expected. Such failure is caused by fragmented planning and mistakes in implementation, project management, and decision-making. These may include, ignoring stakeholders’ needs or the departmental operations that are less ideal for IT product implementation and management, where control and risk prevention are lacking.13 IT project failures can result in delayed schedules, high costs, system uselessness and/or reliability problems, 14 and worst of all, the loss of public confidence in government’s ability and accountability when handling taxpayer’s money. Fear of potential IT project failure can make governments hesitate when considering introducing IT products or deciding not to adopt IT products to eliminate risks. Therefore, IT failure could result in a vicious cycle: less innovation in IT projects due to fear, less effort put into IT projects because of the repeated and perceived failure, and less chance for success.

One of the many examples of IT project failure is the Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada’s attempt to build a fully integrated system, Agconnex, for farmers which resulted in a $14 million failure.15 Another example is the Automated Land and Mineral Record System (ALMRS) system in the U.S., which aimed to improve the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) ability to record, maintain, and retrieve information on land description and ownership. ALMRS’s major software component—Initial Operating Capability (IOC)—failed to meet BLM’s needs and was not deployable. 16 This is because BLM failed to strengthen its investment management system acquisition processes and an overall project plan and timeline for actions.17 After spending $411 million, including $67 million spending on the IOC software development, the project was terminated in 1998.18

 

THE FACTORS THAT DETERMINE IT PROJECT FAILURES

Introducing IT products to organizations is not a linear technological change but involves complex human factors. 19 Three main factors—people, process, and product—contribute to IT project failure or success in governments. 20 Any interruptions in the people, process, and product implementation stages can result in ripple effects and eventually the project’s failure. For example, when there is stakeholder resistance, reaching a common goal and developing plans becomes more difficult. Such resistance also results in delays in project scheduling and difficulty in managing the IT implementation. There are no sequential relationships: any delay in the schedule can result in difficulty in management which then affects stakeholder and user confidence, as demonstrated in the graph below.

 

PEOPLE

As the initial step that leads to IT project failures/successes, the people factor includes government departments, external/private sector stakeholders, and citizens/end-users. 21 The quality of departmental collaboration, stakeholder support/resistance and end-users’ comments on product functionality requirements can all become factors in the potential IT project failure/success.

First, the quality of departmental collaboration can initiate smooth IT planning, but the lack of an effective cross-departmental IT strategy and working governance can be a problem.22 For example, the Sustainable Access in Rural India (SARI) project in Tamil Nadu, India, was an e-government project that used a Wireless-in-Local Loop (WLL) technology to provide internet connections to 39 rural villages in the region.23 A lack of clearly defined goals appeared from the beginning—the program only transformed applications from paper-based to electronic submission without changing the traditional less-transparent back-office operations.24 Such a product did not meet the end-users’ expectations; only 12 villages used the service regularly.25 Furthermore, there was no cross functional service delivery framework due to the lack of collaboration with other levels of government and the failure continued in the long run. 26 There was also no sustained public leadership and commitment, either: the involved officials and staff constantly changed and there was no consistent support for the new technology which induced changes in the traditional roles, authorities and network.27

Second, the development of IT projects often involves multiple stakeholders who have different management styles and goals. 28 Their willingness to collaborate directly affects the project success or failure. For example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the U.S. is responsible for the security of cyber space. Its programs are aimed at recovery efforts for public and private internet systems, identifying laws and regulations regarding recovery in the event of a major internet disruption, evaluating plans for recovery, and assessing challenges.29 Clarification of roles and responsibilities is crucial because in the course of internet recovery, the private sector owns and operates the majority of the internet.30 Yet there was no consensus among public and private stakeholders about what DHS’ role was or when it should get involved.31 The private sector was reluctant to share information on internet performance with the government, but the government could only take limited actions due to legal issues.32 Such lack of stakeholder engagement directly resulted in the DHS programs failure.

Third, end-users are one of the most crucial components, since their approval of service quality and product functionality indicates the success of IT projects. Meeting end-user’ performance expectations, such as system usefulness and information quality, becomes key to earning their approval on the technology deliverable. Romania’s e-government success largely depended on how its services meet the citizens’ needs of usefulness, ease of use and quality and trust of e- government services.33 In this sense, IT products’ ability to influence citizens’ choices, offer personalized services, and build trust become three pillars to make citizens accept IT products.34

 

PROCESS

The process stage follows the engagement of the people factors. The process is a broad and complex business concept, which includes clarifying the purpose of introducing IT products agreed upon by most/all stakeholders, identifying the desired features of the product, purchasing or manufacturing the product by establishing partnerships with the private sector, developing a detailed and complete plan on how to implement the products (finance, deadline, evaluation, and accountability), managing IT product implementation both internally and externally, and delivering a functioning final product. The IT process is fundamentally a change management process due to the introduction of new technology35 which establishes the purpose/motivation of IT projects, develops plans to implement IT products, and creates procedures to manage the IT implementation internally and externally. Because IT projects often involve stakeholders from both public and private sectors (technology vendors and consultants), any conflict between the different approaches to managing IT projects can result in project failure. Therefore, the first step is to identify the purposes of the IT project by defining the different interests and identifying common goals between the different stakeholders in the same or different sectors. Understanding different interests enables all the various sectors to identify desired features of the final IT products and develop a coordinated framework to work together. If the final IT project reflects the common goals and coordination and is delivered on schedule, within budget, and has all the required functionality in the final deliverable, the IT project can be considered a success. Any failure in the process can result in the project failures.

First, the business driver —why an IT product is purchased/designed and implemented—is a strong influencer on how the product is implemented.36 For example, if an IT product is introduced because there is leftover budget money at the end of the fiscal year, instead of meeting the identified needs of end-users, the IT project runs the risk of imposing a piece of unwanted technology on and receiving negative reactions from end-users. Globally, the e-government initiative failures often happen when the political stakeholder interest determines the IT design and process, not the users’ needs.37 Political and business influences that create conflicts of interest can play significant parts in IT project failures. For example, a case study in a small town in Germany found that the municipal government faced mayoral elections and the former mayor was running for re-election. The government wished to initiate administrative reform using the e- government implementation as one of the re-election campaign themes. 38 While the project appeared to be high on the political agenda, the actual implementation was fraught with challenges because of conflicts within the project team. The following summary outlines some of the issues the project faced:

  • The differences in goal setting in the project team composed of different actors, including consultants, system engineers, researchers, and municipal public servants who had different expertise and interpretations of how municipal government functions.39
  • Potential end-users were not involved until the IT product prototype was 40
  • The accountability framework was never established, so it became unclear about who should pay for the software 41
  • The mayor actively sold the e-government solution for the election campaign, so the doubts about the project failure were 42

The system was never truly functional and only existed for election purposes. Therefore, identifying the drivers behind the IT projects is crucial to understand why IT products are implemented. Defining the reason for adopting IT products is an important step towards the coordination between different sectors and stakeholders.

Second, the planning stage is crucial in terms of the management of the implementation process that usually involves both public and private sectors. Three areas—knowledge of IT products and the selection and implementation process, the project agenda and leadership during the planning and implementation process—need special attention to avoid the symptoms of IT project failure (delay, over budget, and a malfunctioning product as discussed earlier). The lack of knowledge can result in:

  • a negative attitude by decision makers towards IT products;
  • resistance to change by end users;
  • unwillingness to accept new ideas, and
  • fear of losing power or job 43

The lack of knowledge of products and vendors may also cause concern when selecting the IT product provider/designer from the private sector prior to contracting the implementation of the IT product. 44 Without sufficient knowledge of the potential IT product and the private sector operations, monitoring, reviewing, and communicating with the private sector IT provider/designer during the implementation phase becomes difficult. 45 Therefore, delays in schedule, higher costs, and ineffective service can happen due to insufficient knowledge of the IT products, private sector operations, and knowing how to manage both. One example is the intranet system implemented for the U.S. Navy that exceeded the cost of almost 4 million dollars in 2004 and completed two years later than the planned completion date.46 47 48

 

PROPOSED SOLUTION

After accumulating in-house IT knowledge and identifying policy gaps, an agenda and leadership framework should be developed as the second step in planning. An agenda in the IT process is more than a technology implementation process. It is about setting a timeline that makes IT products acceptable to end-users, along with change or transformation of organizational structure and practice in governments, and expecting on-time, under-budgeted, and functional deliverables.49 Overambitious or unrealistic agendas may be developed if people involved in the IT processes are politically or business driven and do not have commonly agreed upon goal(s). Strong leadership must be in place when developing realistic agendas. Leadership plays a crucial role in IT project planning. A revised agenda may be required to meet unexpected changes, address managerial concerns when both public and private sectors are involved in the same project, and oversee the policy area.

Lack of leadership and insufficient in-house IT knowledge, as well as gaps in IT policy/management, may be one reason the government relies on only a few oligopoly IT suppliers when outsourcing the e-government design and implementation to the private sector. 50 The mismanagement and lack of overseeing policy areas can be reflected in the Canadian government funded Canada Health Infoway, a project which failed to establish a national electronic health record (EHR) after $1.6 billion was spent between 2001 and 2011.51 A case study of the 10-year history of Canada’s e-health plan (based on reviewing national reports and documents as well as conducting interviews with 29 key stakeholders responsible for policy and strategy establishment for health IT from national and provincial organizations) identified that the lack of an e-health policy, inadequate involvement of clinicians, the lack of a business case for using EHR, inadequate regional interoperability, and inflexibility in approach were major barriers to adopting a national EHR.52

Third, the process of implementing and managing IT projects should include managing the technology provider and the relevant departments as well as end users. This is perhaps the most demanding area in the people, process, and product IT project lifecycle because of the various human factors involved in different sectors with different interests, operations, and culture. The public-private (sector) partnerships (P3) arrangement has transferred some traditional government- manned projects to the private sector, which effectively use the comparative advantage of the private sector in terms of efficiency, flexibility, risk sharing, and information asymmetry reduction.53 Successful P3s is powerful in promoting IT project success because of the common goals and different expertise that both sectors bring. For example, in Romania after 2000, an e- procurement system accommodated both public servants and private sector suppliers in its design and management. It enabled the government to manage hundreds of millions of US dollars of transactions annually and reduced opportunities for corruption due to system transparency. 54 Therefore, increasing the e-government success can lay in bridging the gaps between IT products and the reality of government through effective management of P3 to ensure that the private sector IT design matches the public sector uses.55 However, there are many other factors, such as the lack of shared vision, respect, and trust, as well as the weak consensual decision-making capabilities that may result in issues around P3 and effective external management.56

Ideally, the application of technology should enable the government to better serve the public. Many IT products are created and designed by the private-sector. However, the private sector may lack the understanding of the unique processes, systems, structures, and culture in the public sector and cannot meet the governments’ timelines and specific organizational needs in IT design and implementation. 57 Such different views on the purposes of IT products make the internal management of IT products extremely difficult because the gaps in training and staffing and the existing public-sector culture may not meet the requirements of operating IT products. Different operations can reflect in the different perspectives in recognizing risk and risk management styles. As the public sector aims to minimize risks to be more accountable with the public’s money, a risk management plan sometimes does not exist or is not able to solve problems when crises happen. Yet, in general, the private sector is more risk-taking than the public sector and the implementation of new IT products may not be risk-free. Potential risks may be reflected by neglecting the necessary transition between the government’s traditional management processes and the requirements of new management when using technology. For example, the underlining problem in Liverpool, United Kingdom (UK) and in Sheffield, UK 2002 e-voting pilot project identified the gaps between a third-party commercial private sector technology provider and the traditional voting management process in the public sector without addressing potential risks before the election.58 The e-voting controversy in Florida during the 2000 presidential election is another example of government IT failure due in part to insufficient risk identification and a risk management framework.59

 

PRODUCT

The costliest elements of the IT project are the people and the processes. Without a clearly defined plan and change management strategy the project could likely fail.

However, the IT product is what citizens often perceive as the proof of IT project failure. There are some key points that measure the functionality of IT products. For example, IT product quality measures information relevancy, creditability, accessibility, and most importantly, service quality improvement.60 Other aspects include error-free data, consistency in technical performance, and timely and secure information delivery within government. 61 Moreover, fully functional IT products should reflect the common goal that stakeholders originally agreed upon without undesirable outcomes in both the people and process steps. Malfunctioning IT products do not only include the less functional products, but also the products that do not meet the needs of the end-users or the organizations.

A few theoretical models can be used to evaluate if the IT product is a success or a failure. For example, the functionality of the IT products can be summarized using DeLone and McLeans’62 information system (IS) six success components: information quality, system quality, service quality, IS use, user satisfaction, and perceived net benefit.63 End-users’ feedback should be the core of IT product performance evaluation, since citizens/end-users are one of the most important stakeholders of e-government activities and their satisfaction is a factor in measuring e- government service success.64 Furthermore, evaluating IT products is not only an examination of the technology itself, but also a learning process from the whole IT project in order to achieve long-term continuous improvement.

There are more elements that result in the failure to deliver functional IT products in the Canadian federal government. In terms of federal government projects there is the potential for conflict between the political agenda for the software selection and implementation and the departmental end-user and/or the public needs. As mentioned in previous sections, successful projects are those which define the requirements and select and implement a product with clearly defined goals, deliverables and timelines. Projects that fail may be those where software is selected to meet political agendas or because budget money is available at year-end, as has been identified, without any attention to effective implementation schedule and end user requirements.

Therefore, regarding the functionality of IT products mentioned in the previous two paragraphs, IT products in the federal government may present various symptoms of failure such as those software products that have been purchased to meet political agendas. They could end up sitting on shelves and not implemented. The Phoenix pay system is an example of a malfunctioning product that reflects political will, which is discussed in the next section.

 

CASE STUDY

The Phoenix pay system—a malfunctioning, unfixable, and money-eating system—is an example of a current and high-profile IT project failure in the Canadian federal government. The original proposal was to create a centralized payroll management system to save approximately $700 million from the salaries of compensation advisors in each department across the county. 65 However, thousands of employees have been incorrectly paid or not paid at all since Phoenix launched in 2016.66 Currently the attempts to fix Phoenix could cost over $1 billion, while stopping its use could also cost hundreds of millions. 67 As a typical IT project failure (overbudget, malfunctioning product, and loss of public confidence), Phoenix shows a series of failures in the people, process, and IT project management lifecycle. The recent Auditor General (2018) pointed to a few key issues that resulted in the Phoenix project failure. These included a lack of project management from Public Services and Procurement Canada, inadequate engagement with and participation of departments and agencies in designing and building Phoenix, and implementing the Phoenix system when it was not ready.68

By establishing a new payroll management operating model, Phoenix brought a significant change to the complex payroll system in the federal government in areas such as staffing and skillset requirements. 69 Ostensibly, political will, or desiring immediate financial returns may have prevented a collaboration between departments in the areas of planning, communicating, and identifying and addressing risks and concerns.70 Stakeholder involvement appeared to be flawed, especially with the technology provider IBM from the early bidding stage.71 Top-down decision- making processes and influence may have resulted in neglecting to address end-users’ feedback, those staff members that used Phoenix on a daily basis.72 Accordingly, the failure to address institutional changes, stakeholder collaboration, and end-user feedback may have led to the mismatch between Phoenix and the government functions, resulting in project failure.73

After failing the initial people step, Phoenix experienced a fragmented and ill-managed IT process. While the political will leaned towards quickly implementing the software during the change of political parties, 74 other stakeholders wished to have a functional payroll system. Different purposes/motivations and agendas resulted in multi-directional planning, and implementation timelines and deliverables. In-house IT knowledge appeared to be scarce. It was also said that project leadership, risk management oversight, and external and internal management virtually did not exist. The project went ahead even after payroll advisors voiced concerns about the system defects and risks.75 Phoenix’s failure could be inevitable when the system implementation and management was not based on goals agreed by all stakeholders. In other words, the failure of both the people and the process components resulted in a payroll system that did not meet stakeholder’s expectation, created more errors than the current solutions could correct, and led to tremendous financial loss.76

 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROMOTING IT PROJECT SUCCESS

 IT project success requires the collaboration between people, processes, and product. These factors are inter-related and changing due to people’s altering work environment and updates to technology. These factors make IT projects complex and vulnerable to failure. In this sense, IT projects are fragile: the success of IT projects requires every step to be agreed upon by the various people involved. Each step also has a sequential impact/influence on the next step. For example, the collaboration between government departments is a pre-requisite of establishing leadership and achieving effective external management in the P3. Effective internal and external project and change management in IT implementation procedures are key to ensure that the IT product deliverables are on time, within budget, and most importantly, functioning. In this way, any step must be fastidiously measured and managed, as demonstrated below.

To bridge the gaps between the ideal state (IT project success) and the reality (IT project failure), Goss Gilroy Inc. proposed 17 lessons to learn from Phoenix.77 78

The following recommendations will provide actionable supplements in a people, process, and product sequence to the theoretical lessons, which is not only applicable to Phoenix but future IT projects in the Canadian context. IT experts and information managers’ roles in stakeholder engagement, active participation in the IT procurement, implementation, and management process, and end-user feedback are emphasized.

The first step is to the creation of a leadership role, such as a Minister of Information, to be responsible for people management and central coordination in IT projects. Distributing IT tasks to different departments results in the lack of central power. Stakeholder engagement and common goal setting become difficult when no central power exists to coordinate and manage the complex relations among people and/or organizations. Creating a Minister of Information role is crucial79 in overseeing IT initiatives, such as identifying special needs of a wide range of stakeholders, building relations with the private sector, monitoring the planning and implementation timelines, and changing strategies based on changing priorities and circumstance. The Department of Information should be the central coordinator to effectively use other departments’ resources and establish clear accountability on IT projects. This department should include interdisciplinary experts in IT, information/data management, business/government relations, policy, economics, and psychology to link IT with other key government functions. Most importantly, the department should recognize IT experts and information managers as the most important stakeholders since IT experts and information managers’ expertise can equip the public sector with necessary IT knowledge, match their needs with IT product features, and predict technical risks. Changes in IT processes, such as change of management, communications, and in-house IT capacity may become possible after establishing strong central leadership.

The second step after establishing leadership is to initiate a change of project management responsibility in the IT process. Such change management reflects in the change in external management and internal management. In external management, successful P3s are powerful in promoting IT project success because of the different expertise and resources that both sectors bring. Strong leadership will be responsible for establishing common goals between the public and private sectors, despite the different values and methods of operation. Risk sharing in customizing IT products, instead of buy-off-the-shelf practice, must be negotiated. The successful implementation of the P3 model results in internal stakeholder support and positive organizational culture that meet the needs of introducing and operating new IT products, risk identification, and end-user considerations. In the 2013 Florida iProject, a bidding process was used to identify the top bidder with the most expertise and knowledge in software operating systems.80 Negotiations followed with the successful bidder to identify potential problems in collaboration, test design and product implementation, a method to adopt the agreed-on changes and cost proposal was developed.81 The final product was a functional, one-stop service portal in traffic congestion.82

The project became a success because of the application of the P3 model and the use of effective external management to return a product that met the public sector stakeholder’s needs.83

In internal management, it is crucial to achieve internal culture changes, to develop an understanding that IT projects are not just purchasing technical products but that they are a series in implementing business processes. Every project has potential risks, governments must proactively develop and adopt a risk detection and management framework rather than engaging in the traditional management style, i.e., that governments do not engage in risky behaviour. Any refusal to change the understanding, attitude, and approach towards IT projects may only result in the loss of control when unexpected situations happen. IT experts and information managers need to play an active role in both the external and internal management processes. Their knowledge of IT products can be useful when communicating with the private sector about the desired features of IT products and the establishment of a risk management framework. Internally, IT experts and information managers also have the knowledge of government operations, so the culture change that treats IT implementation and management as a business process could be achieved.

The U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) e-file system in 1999,an electronic income tax return filing system, was a successful case in applying both external and internal management.84 Serving tens of millions of users in the U.S. each year, the IRS system is an example of long-standing successful partnership between the government and the private sector vendor specialized in tax preparation and software development.85 The IRS defined the requirements for the tax-return filing, and a private sector vendor developed software in order to enable tax filing electronically.86 Changes in the internal management of IRS were reflected in establishing strong IRS leadership and the willingness to take risks.87 Such a positive change of external and internal management helped to set a common goal, served the same interests, and created opportunities for all stakeholders. The smooth partnership makes the private sector keen to develop a partnership with IRS and understand the organizational policies and tax environment, while providing the IRS an opportunity to reengineer its tax filing process, thereby achieving a simpler, faster, and virtually error-free state as well as expanding its market.88 The IRS also received support from existing stakeholders, such as the Council for Electronic Revenue Communications Advancement and the National Association of Enrolled Agents, and attracted new expanded partners, such as third-party transmitters, credit card processors, and not-for-profit and professional groups.89

The third step is to change perceptions about IT products and raise the awareness about their implementation and ongoing support and maintenance. An IT product is not a onetime purchase. It requires expert in-house knowledge in project planning, product functionality, budget modification, policy development, software and user evaluation, and continuous product and process improvement. IT experts and information managers’ knowledge about IT products can be particularly useful for long-term IT product maintenance, risk management, and product improvement. When IT experts and information managers become active stakeholders in all stages of IT project planning, negotiation, and implementation, their consistent and insightful knowledge about every stage of the IT project could increase their influence in the decision-making for a particular IT project and future projects. With the involvement of IT experts and information managers, strong leadership should include both a top down and a bottom-up approach, as end- users should become the decision-makers of what products they will be able to use, not the political staff. Since IT experts and information managers are often end-users or work closely with end- users for technical assistance purposes, their input can be one of the most valuable components in the improvement of IT products and further IT projects. Therefore, departments should also share IT best practices, experience, and knowledge with each other to further create IT value.

 

CONCLUSION

IT project failure implies that the project outcomes are not what were initially expected and often come with undesirable results. IT project success implies that the project outcomes match most stakeholder groups’ original goals and that there are no significantly undesirable outcomes of IT process and products. Indicators of failure or success are driven by the project timeline, budget, and the functionality of final IT products. IT project failure is rarely due to the malfunction of technology itself but the human factors and underlying government policy at different stages of IT product implementation.90 The paper answered the research question “what are the factors that contribute to the success or the failure of IT projects in governments” through an analysis of various aspects of the people, process, and product in an IT project life cycle. Without leadership and sufficient in-house IT knowledge, governments tend to make decisions by instinct or private sector councils, so the failure of linking IT products with the internal departmental function becomes inevitable.91

In the Canadian context, the recommended three-step actions—establishing a leadership role to oversee people management and centralized coordination in IT projects, changing external and internal project management, and changing perspectives about IT products are crucial to fundamentally improve the current practice in IT product procurement and project management and reduce or even eliminate IT project failures. IT experts and information managers’ involvement in all stages of the project, from business case to implementation are crucial because IT specialists have the technology knowledge. They should be part of the decision-making process, involved in negotiations regarding technology procurement or design, and gathering end-user input for IT product improvement. Large-scale IT project failures, such as Phoenix, will not stop until there are changes to leadership and management in people, process, and product IT product selection and implementation. Only when Canada re-examines the relationships between people, IT implementation processes, and product selection and makes the necessary changes to meet the requirements of IT project success, will it realize the benefits of IT projects.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Bhuiyan, Shahjahan H. “Modernizing Bangladesh Public Administration through E-governance:
Benefits and Challenges.” Government Information Quarterly 28(1) (2011): 54-65.
Accessed November 19, 2017. doi: 10.1016/j.giq.2010.04.006.
Blumenthal, A. “The long view.” Government Executive, 39 no. 8, (2007): 63 . http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/d ocview/204321170?accountid=10406
Ciborra, Claudio. “Interpreting E-government and Development: Efficiency, Transparency or Governance at a Distance?” Information Technology & People 18, no. 3 (2005): 260-79. doi: 10.1108/09593840510615879
Colesca, Sofia Elena, and Dobrica Liliana. “E-government Adoption in Romania” Proceedings of World Academy of Science: Engineering & Technology, 44, 170-174. Accessed April 19, 2018. http://waset.org/publications/15361/e-government-adoption-in-romania
Das Aundhe, M. and Narasimhan, R. “Public Private Partnership (PPP) Outcomes in E- government – a Social Capital Explanation.” International Journal of Public Sector Management 29, no. 7 (2016): 638-58. doi: 10.1108/IJPSM-09-2015-0160
Delone, William H. and Ephraim R. McLean. “The DeLone and McLean Model of Information Systems Success: A Ten-Year Update.” Journal of Management Information Systems 19, no. 4 (2003): 9-30.
Dovifat, Angela, Martin Bruggemeier, and Klaus Lenk. “The “model of micropolitical arenas” – A framework to understand the innovation process of e-government-projects.” Information Polity: The International Journal of Government & Democracy in the Information Age 12(3) (2007): 127-138. Accessed April 19, 2017. http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&sid=8edccd57-d1eb- 41be-b0e6-157afe952834%40sessionmgr102
General Accounting Office (GAO). Land Management Systems: Status of BLM’s Actions to Improve Information Technology Management: Report to the Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives. United States, Office, 2000.
Gillmore, Meagan. “More problems with Phoenix pay system revealed,” Rabble.ca, September 22, 2017. http://rabble.ca/news/2017/09/more-problems-phoenix-pay-system-revealed
Heeks, Richard. “E-Government as a Carrier of Context.” Journal of Public Policy 25, no. 1 (2005): 51-74. Accessed April 19, 2018. http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/d ocview/58870342?accountid=10406
Heinrich, Erik. “The big chill: E-government poses many promises for the enlightened age. but will it save us from red tape or deliver us into evil?” Info Systems Executive, 6, no. 2 (2001): 10-13. Accessed April 19, 2018. http://www8.umoncton.ca/umcm-fass- administrationpublique/forum_2001/chill.pdf
Holden, Stephen H., and Patricia D. Fletcher. “The Virtual Value Chain and E-Government Partnership: Non-Monetary Agreements in the IRS E-File Program.” International Journal of Public Administration 28, no. 7-8 (2005): 643-664. doi: 10.1081/PAD-200064223
House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee. “Government and IT— ‘a recipe for rip-offs’: Time for a new approach,” (2011). Accessed November 19, 2017. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmpubadm/715/715i.pdf
Imran, Ahmed, and Shirley Gregor. “Uncovering the Hidden Issues in E-Government Adoption in a Least Developed Country: The Case of Bangladesh.” Journal of Global Information Management, 18, no. 2 (2010): 30-56. Accessed April 19, 2018. doi: 10.4018/jgim.2010040102.
Ireton, Julie. “Phoenix payroll system doomed from the start: report,” CBC News, October 05, 2017. Accessed November 19, 2017. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/phoenix- federal-government-report-lessons-1.4339476
Kelly, Scarlett. Digital Information Revolution Changes in Canada: E-Government Design, the Battle Against Illicit Drugs, and Health Care Reform. [Alberta: Lammi Publishing Inc., 2016]
Kumar, Rajendra, and Michael L. Best. “Impact and Sustainability of E-Government Services in Developing Countries: Lessons Learned from Tamil Nadu, India.” The Information Society 22, no. 1 (2006): 1-12. doi: 10.1080/01972240500388149
Lammam, Charles, Hugh MacIntyre, Jason Clemens, Milagros Palacios, and Niels Veldhuis. “Federal government failure in Canada : A review of the Auditor General’s reports, 1988- 2013.” Accessed April 19, 2017, [Vancouver, British Columbia: Fraser Institute].
Lawther, Wendell C. “The Growing Use of Competitive Negotiations to Increase Managerial Capability: The Acquisition of E-Government Services.” Public Performance & Management Review 30, no. 2 (2006): 203-20. doi: 10.2753/PMR1530-9576300204
Luna-Reyes, Luis F. and J. Ramon Gil-Garcia. “Using Institutional Theory and Dynamic Simulation to Understand Complex E-Government Phenomena.” Government Information Quarterly 28, no. 3 (2011): 329-45. Accessed April 19, 2017. doi: 10.1016/j.giq.2010.08.007
McGlinchey, D. Navy streamlines its intranet contract. (2004). Accessed April 19, 2017. www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1004/100604d1.htm
Moynihan, Donald P. “Building Secure Elections: E‐Voting, Security, and Systems Theory.” Public Administration Review 64, no. 5 (2004): 515-28. doi: 10.1111/j.1540- 6210.2004.00400.x
Office of Auditor General of Canada. “Report 1—Building and Implementing the Phoenix Pay System.” Last modified May 29, 2018. http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/att e_43045.html
Osman, Anouze, Irani, Al-Ayoubi, Lee, Balcı, Medeni, and Weerakkody. “COBRA Framework to Evaluate E-government Services: A Citizen-centric Perspective.” Government Information Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2014): 243-56. doi: 10.1016/j.giq.2013.10.009
Randell, Brian. “A Computer Scientist’s Reactions to NPfIT.” Journal of Information Technology 22(3) (2007): 222-234. Accessed November 19, 2017. doi: 10.1057/palgrave.jit.2000106 Rozenblum, Ronen, Jang, Yeona, Zimlichman, Eyal, Salzberg, Claudia, Tamblyn, Melissa,
Buckeridge, David, Forster, Alan, Bates, David W, and Tamblyn, Robyn. “A Qualitative Study of Canada’s Experience with the Implementation of Electronic Health Information Technology.” CMAJ: Canadian Medical Association Journal = Journal De L’Association Medicale Canadienne 183, no. 5 (2011): E281-8. doi: 10.1503/cmaj.100856
Schuppan, Tino. “E-Government in Developing Countries: Experiences from Sub-Saharan Africa.” Government Information Quarterly 26, no. 1 (2009): 118-27. doi: 10.1016/j.giq.2008.01.006
Scotti, Monique. “With Phoenix pay system fix potentially costing $1B, union says time to pull the plug,” Global News, November 14, 2017. Accessed November 14, 2017. https://globalnews.ca/news/3859554/phoenix-pay-system-fix-cost-billion-union/
Seng, Wong Meng, Stephen Jackson, and George Philip. “Cultural Issues in Developing E- Government in Malaysia.” Behaviour & Information Technology 29(4) (2010): 423-32. Accessed November 19, 2017. doi: 10.1080/01449290903300931
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. “Lessons Learned from the Transformation of Pay Administration Initiative, October 2017.” Last modified October 10, 2017. https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/corporate/reports/lessons-learned- transformation-pay-administration-initiative.html#1
U.S. General Accounting Office. Information technology: Issues affecting cost impact of Navy Marine Corps intranet need to be resolved (GAO-03–33). (2002a). Accessed November 19, 2017. [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office]
Wang, Yi-Shun and Liao, Yi-Wen. “Assessing EGovernment Systems Success: A Validation of the DeLone and McLean Model of Information Systems Success.” Government Information Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2008): 717-33. doi: 10.1016/j.giq.2007.06.002
Wilshusen, G.C. “Internet Infrastructure: Challenges in Developing a Public/Private Recovery Plan.” 2006. [States: Government Accountability Office]
Xenakis, A and Macintosh, A. “Lessons learned from the e-voting pilots in the United Kingdom”. E-government: Information, technology, and transformation (Advances in management information systems; v. 17). (2010). Schnoll, Hans J Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.

 

WORK CITED

1Shahjahan H. Bhuiyan. “Modernizing Bangladesh Public Administration through E-governance: Benefits and Challenges.” Government Information Quarterly 28(1) (2011): 54-65. Accessed April 19, 2018. doi: 10.1016/j.giq.2010.04.006.
2Shahjahan H. Bhuiyan. “Modernizing Bangladesh Public Administration through E-governance: Benefits and Challenges.” Government Information Quarterly 28(1) (2011): 54-65. Accessed November 19, 2017. doi: 10.1016/j.giq.2010.04.006.
3Richard Heeks. “E-Government as a Carrier of Context.” Journal of Public Policy 25, no. 1 (2005): 51-74. Accessed April 19, 2018. http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/docview/58870342?acco untid=10406
4Julie Ireton. “Phoenix payroll system doomed from the start: report,” CBC News, October 05, 2017. Accessed November 19, 2017. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/phoenix-federal-government-report-lessons-1.4339476
5Erik Heinrich. “The big chill: E-government poses many promises for the enlightened age. but will it save us from red tape or deliver us into evil?” Info Systems Executive, 6, no. 2 (2001): 10-13. Accessed April s19, 2018. http://www8.umoncton.ca/umcm-fass-administrationpublique/forum_2001/chill.pdf
6Scarlett Kelly. Digital Information Revolution Changes in Canada: E-Government Design, the Battle Against Illicit Drugs, and Health Care Reform. [Alberta: Lammi Publishing Inc., 2016]
7Tino Schuppan. “E-Government in Developing Countries: Experiences from Sub-Saharan Africa.” Government Information Quarterly 26, no. 1 (2009): 118-27. doi: 10.1016/j.giq.2008.01.006
8Charles Lammam, Hugh MacIntyre, Jason Clemens, Milagros Palacios, and Niels Veldhuis. “Federal government failure in Canada: A review of the Auditor General’s reports, 1988-2013.” Accessed April 19, 2017, [Vancouver, British Columbia: Fraser Institute].
9ibid
10Nurul Aisyah Sim Abdullah, Nor Laila Mohd Noor, and Emma Nuraihan Mior Ibrahim. “Contributing Factors to E- Government Service Disruptions.” Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 10, no. 1 (2016): 120-138. http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/docview/1774537026?accountid=10406.
11ibid
12Richard Heeks. “E-Government as a Carrier of Context.” Journal of Public Policy 25, no. 1 (2005): 51-74. Accessed April 19, 2018. http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/docview/58870342?acco untid=10406
13Charles Lammam, Hugh MacIntyre, Jason Clemens, Milagros Palacios, and Niels Veldhuis. “Federal government failure in Canada: A review of the Auditor General’s reports, 1988-2013.” Accessed April 19, 2017, [Vancouver, British Columbia: Fraser Institute].
14Brian Randell. “A Computer Scientist’s Reactions to NPfIT.” Journal of Information Technology 22(3) (2007): 222- Accessed November 19, 2017. doi: 10.1057/palgrave.jit.2000106
15Charles Lammam, Hugh MacIntyre, Jason Clemens, Milagros Palacios, and Niels Veldhuis. “Federal government failure in Canada: A review of the Auditor General’s reports, 1988-2013.” Accessed April 19, 2017, [Vancouver, British Columbia: Fraser Institute].
16General Accounting Office (GAO). Land Management Systems: Status of BLM’s Actions to Improve Information Technology Management: Report to the Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives. United States, Office, 2000.
17ibid
18ibid
19Wong Meng Seng, Stephen Jackson, and George Philip. “Cultural Issues in Developing E-Government in Malaysia.” Behaviour & Information Technology 29(4) (2010): 423-32. Accessed November 19, 2017. doi: 10.1080/01449290903300931
20Nurul Aisyah Sim Abdullah, Nor Laila Mohd Noor, and Emma Nuraihan Mior Ibrahim. “Contributing Factors to E- Government Service Disruptions.” Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 10, no. 1 (2016): 120-138. http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/docview/1774537026?accountid=10406.
21Wong Meng Seng, Stephen Jackson, and George Philip. “Cultural Issues in Developing E-Government in Malaysia.” Behaviour & Information Technology 29, no. 4 (2010): 423-32. Accessed November 19, 2017. doi: 10.1080/01449290903300931
22House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee. “Government and IT— ‘a recipe for rip-offs’: Time for a new approach,” (2011). Accessed November 19, 2017. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmpubadm/715/715i.pdf
23Rajendra Kumar and Michael L. Best. “Impact and Sustainability of E-Government Services in Developing Countries: Lessons Learned from Tamil Nadu, India.” The Information Society 22, no. 1 (2006): 1-12. doi: 10.1080/01972240500388149
24ibid
25ibid
26ibid
27ibid
28Angela Dovifat, Martin Bruggemeier, and Klaus Lenk. “The “model of micropolitical arenas” – A framework to understand the innovation process of e-government-projects.” Information Polity: The International Journal of Government & Democracy in the Information Age 12(3) (2007): 127-138. Accessed April 19, 2017. http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&sid=8edccd57-d1eb-41be-b0e6- 157afe952834%40sessionmgr102
29G.C Wilshusen. “Internet Infrastructure: Challenges in Developing a Public/Private Recovery Plan.” 2006. [States: Government Accountability Office]
30ibid
31G.C Wilshusen. “Internet Infrastructure: Challenges in Developing a Public/Private Recovery Plan.” 2006. [States: Government Accountability Office]
32ibid
33Sofia Elena Colesca and Dobrica Liliana. “E-government Adoption in Romania” Proceedings of World Academy of Science: Engineering & Technology, 44, 170-174. Accessed April 19, 2018. http://waset.org/publications/15361/e-government-adoption-in-romania
34H Alshibly and R Chiong. “Customer Empowerment: Does It Influence Electronic Government Success? A Citizen-centric Perspective.” Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 14, no. 6 (2015): 393-404. doi: 10.1016/j.elerap.2015.05.003
35Ciborra, Claudio. “Interpreting E-government and Development: Efficiency, Transparency or Governance at a Distance?” Information Technology & People 18, no. 3 (2005): 260-79. doi: 10.1108/09593840510615879
36Qasim Al-Mamari, Brian Corbitt, and Victor Oyaro Gekara. “E-government Adoption in Oman: Motivating Factors from a Government Perspective.” Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 7, no. 2 (2013): 199-224. Accessed April 19, 2017. doi: 10.1108/17506161311325369
37Richard Heeks. “E-Government as a Carrier of Context.” Journal of Public Policy 25, no. 1 (2005): 51-74. Accessed April 19, 2018. http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/docview/58870342?acco untid=10406
38Angela Dovifat, Martin Bruggemeier, and Klaus Lenk. “The “model of micropolitical arenas” – A framework to understand the innovation process of e-government-projects.” Information Polity: The International Journal of Government & Democracy in the Information Age 12(3) (2007): 127-138. Accessed April 19, 2017. http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&sid=8edccd57-d1eb-41be-b0e6- 157afe952834%40sessionmgr102
39ibid
40ibid
41ibid
42ibid
43Ahmed Imran and Shirley Gregor. “Uncovering the Hidden Issues in E-Government Adoption in a Least Developed Country: The Case of Bangladesh.” Journal of Global Information Management, 18, no. 2 (2010): 30-56. Accessed April 19, 2018. doi: 10.4018/jgim.2010040102.
44Wendell C. Lawther. “The Growing Use of Competitive Negotiations to Increase Managerial Capability: The Acquisition of E-Government Services.” Public Performance & Management Review 30, no. 2 (2006): 203-20. doi: 10.2753/PMR1530-9576300204
45ibid
46ibid
47D. McGlinchey. Navy streamlines its intranet contract. (2004). Accessed April 19, 2017. www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1004/100604d1.htm
48U.S. General Accounting Office. Information technology: Issues affecting cost impact of Navy Marine Corps intranet need to be resolved (GAO-03–33). (2002a). Accessed November 19, 2017. [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office]
49Ahmed Imran and Shirley Gregor. “Uncovering the Hidden Issues in E-Government Adoption in a Least Developed Country: The Case of Bangladesh.” Journal of Global Information Management, 18, no. 2 (2010): 30-56. Accessed April 19, 2018. doi: 10.4018/jgim.2010040102.
50House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee. “Government and IT— ‘a recipe for rip-offs’: Time for a new approach,” (2011). Accessed November 19, 2017. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmpubadm/715/715i.pdf
51Ronen Rozenblum, Jang, Yeona, Zimlichman, Eyal, Salzberg, Claudia, Tamblyn, Melissa, Buckeridge, David, Forster, Alan, Bates, David W, and Tamblyn, Robyn. “A Qualitative Study of Canada’s Experience with the Implementation of Electronic Health Information Technology.” CMAJ: Canadian Medical Association Journal = Journal De L’Association Medicale Canadienne 183, no. 5 (2011): E281-8. doi: 10.1503/cmaj.100856
52ibid
53M. Das Aundhe and Narasimhan, R. “Public Private Partnership (PPP) Outcomes in E-government – a Social Capital Explanation.” International Journal of Public Sector Management 29, no. 7 (2016): 638-58. doi: 10.1108/IJPSM-09-2015-0160
54Richard Heeks. “E-Government as a Carrier of Context.” Journal of Public Policy 25, no. 1 (2005): 51-74. Accessed April 19, 2018. http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/docview/58870342?acco untid=10406
55ibid
56M. Das Aundhe and Narasimhan, R. “Public Private Partnership (PPP) Outcomes in E-government – a Social Capital Explanation.” International Journal of Public Sector Management 29, no. 7 (2016): 638-58. doi: 10.1108/IJPSM-09-2015-0160
57Richard Heeks. “E-Government as a Carrier of Context.” Journal of Public Policy 25, no. 1 (2005): 51-74. Accessed April 19, 2018. http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/docview/58870342?acco untid=10406
58A. Xenakis and Macintosh, A. “Lessons learned from the e-voting pilots in the United Kingdom”. E-government: Information, technology, and transformation (Advances in management information systems; v. 17). (2010). Schnoll, Hans J Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
59Moynihan, Donald P. “Building Secure Elections: E‐Voting, Security, and Systems Theory.” Public Administration Review 64, no. 5 (2004): 515-28. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2004.00400.x
60Hussain Alenezi, Ali Tarhini, and Sujeet Kumar Sharma. “Development of Quantitative Model to Investigate the Strategic Relationship between Information Quality and E-government Benefits.” Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 9, no. 3 (2015): 324-51. Accessed April 19, 2017. http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/docview/1748862292?ac countid=10406
61ibid
62William H. Delone and Ephraim R. McLean. “The DeLone and McLean Model of Information Systems Success: A Ten-Year Update.” Journal of Management Information Systems 19, no. 4 (2003): 9-30.
63Wang, Yi-Shun and Liao, Yi-Wen. “Assessing EGovernment Systems Success: A Validation of the DeLone and McLean Model of Information Systems Success.” Government Information Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2008): 717-33. doi: 10.1016/j.giq.2007.06.002
64Osman, Anouze, Irani, Al-Ayoubi, Lee, Balcı, Medeni, and Weerakkody. “COBRA Framework to Evaluate E-government Services: A Citizen-centric Perspective.” Government Information Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2014): 243-56. doi: 10.1016/j.giq.2013.10.009
65Julie Ireton. “Phoenix payroll system doomed from the start: report,” CBC News, October 05, 2017. Accessed November 19, 2017. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/phoenix-federal-government-report-lessons-1.4339476
66ibid
67Monique Scotti. “With Phoenix pay system fix potentially costing $1B, union says time to pull the plug,” Global News, November 14, 2017. Accessed November 14, 2017. https://globalnews.ca/news/3859554/phoenix-pay- system-fix-cost-billion-union/
68Office of Auditor General of Canada. “Report 1—Building and Implementing the Phoenix Pay System.” Last modified May 29, 2018. http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/att e_43045.html
69Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. “Lessons Learned from the Transformation of Pay Administration Initiative, October 2017.” Last modified October 10, 2017. https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board- secretariat/corporate/reports/lessons-learned-transformation-pay-administration-initiative.html#1
70Meagan Gillmore. “More problems with Phoenix pay system revealed,” Rabble.ca, September 22, 2017. http://rabble.ca/news/2017/09/more-problems-phoenix-pay-system-revealed
71ibid
72James Bagnall. “Bagnall: With AG’s report on Phoenix pay system looming, has government actually learned any lessons?” Ottawa Citizen, November 18, 2017. http://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/columnists/bagnall-with-ags- report-on-phoenix-pay-system-looming-has-government-actually-learned-any-lessons
73Luis F. Luna-Reyes, and J. Ramon Gil-Garcia. “Using Institutional Theory and Dynamic Simulation to Understand Complex E-Government Phenomena.” Government Information Quarterly 28, no. 3 (2011): 329-45. Accessed April 19, 2017. doi: 10.1016/j.giq.2010.08.007
74Monique Scotti. “With Phoenix pay system fix potentially costing $1B, union says time to pull the plug,” Global News, November 14, 2017. Accessed November 14, 2017. https://globalnews.ca/news/3859554/phoenix-pay- system-fix-cost-billion-union/
75James Bagnall. “Bagnall: With AG’s report on Phoenix pay system looming, has government actually learned any lessons?” Ottawa Citizen, November 18, 2017. http://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/columnists/bagnall-with-ags- report-on-phoenix-pay-system-looming-has-government-actually-learned-any-lessons
76Meagan Gillmore. “More problems with Phoenix pay system revealed,” Rabble.ca, September 22, 2017. http://rabble.ca/news/2017/09/more-problems-phoenix-pay-system-revealed
77Angela Dovifat, Martin Bruggemeier, and Klaus Lenk. “The “model of micropolitical arenas” – A framework to understand the innovation process of e-government-projects.” Information Polity: The International Journal of Government & Democracy in the Information Age 12(3) (2007): 127-138. Accessed April 19, 2017. http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&sid=8edccd57-d1eb-41be-b0e6- 157afe952834%40sessionmgr102
78Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. “Lessons Learned from the Transformation of Pay Administration Initiative, October 2017.” Last modified October 10, 2017. https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board- secretariat/corporate/reports/lessons-learned-transformation-pay-administration-initiative.html#1
79Scarlett Kelly. Digital Information Revolution Changes in Canada: E-Government Design, the Battle Against Illicit Drugs, and Health Care Reform. [Alberta: Lammi Publishing Inc., 2016]
80Wendell C. Lawther. “The Growing Use of Competitive Negotiations to Increase Managerial Capability: The Acquisition of E-Government Services.” Public Performance & Management Review 30, no. 2 (2006): 203-20. doi: 10.2753/PMR1530-9576300204
81ibid
82ibid
83Wendell C. Lawther. “The Growing Use of Competitive Negotiations to Increase Managerial Capability: The Acquisition of E-Government Services.” Public Performance & Management Review 30, no. 2 (2006): 203-20. doi: 10.2753/PMR1530-9576300204
84Stephen H. Holden and Patricia D. Fletcher. “The Virtual Value Chain and E-Government Partnership: Non-Monetary Agreements in the IRS E-File Program.” International Journal of Public Administration 28, no. 7-8 (2005): 643-664. doi: 10.1081/PAD-200064223
85ibid
86ibid
87ibid
88ibid
89ibid
90House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee. “Government and IT— ‘a recipe for rip-offs’: Time for a new approach,” (2011). Accessed November 19, 2017. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmpubadm/715/715i.pdf
91Blumenthal, A. “The long view.” Government Executive, 39 no. 8, (2007): 63. http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/docview/204321170?acc ountid=10406